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This study focuses on the hiring of nonfamily employees in family firms. Research to
date has emphasized the challenges family firms confront in attracting and selecting quality
nonfamily human capital. This literature has emphasized the limitations these firms face due to
the information asymmetries common to the hiring process. However, this research has not
considered the advantages available to family firms through their social network. Drawing on
agency theory, I hypothesize that owner referral utilization mediates the relationship between
family essence and firm performance because their use lessens the agency conflicts between
owners and nonfamily members. Utilizing a sample of 194 family owners, my analysis shows
that the utilization of owner referrals mediates the relationship between family essence and firm
performance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Challenge of Nonfamily Personnel in Family Firms
Staffing is considered one of the most important and challenging tasks that confront small
family firms (Cardon, 2003; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003). Although family firms typically
hire members of the controlling family to meet their staffing needs, family is a limited resource
and the family unit may lack certain skills necessary for a growing business (e.g. finances,
accounting, etc.) (Tabor, Chrisman, Madison & Vardaman, 2018). Because of this, many family
firms hire nonfamily to fulfill their personnel demands. Upwards of 80% of family firm
employees are nonfamily members, making these individuals critical to the performance of these
firms (Mass Mutual, 2007; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). These employees are recognized as
integral to the expansion, growth and financial and operational health of these businesses
(Graves & Thomas, 2006; Lutz & Schraml, 2012; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). However, while these
firms’ ability to acquire nonfamily human capital is critical to obtaining a sustainable
competitive advantage as they expand, small family firms are often portrayed by family business
scholars as lacking the legitimacy, resources, and knowledge-base to effectively attract outside
personnel (Barney & Wright, 1998; De Kok, Uhlaner, & Thurik, 2006; Greer, Carr, & Hipp,
2016; Williamson, 2000). These limitations are purported to impair the recruiting capacity of
these firms, and are often believed to diminish the pool of qualified applicants (Subramony,
2009).
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More notably, however, family firms are typically controlled and influenced by a single
dominant family coalition. Due to their commitment to the family unit, these family coalitions
often use their firms as a vehicle to compensate and promote family members, limiting their
ability to incentivize nonfamily personnel (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, &
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Verbeke & Kano, 2012).
Consequentially, research finds that family firms offer lower compensation, fewer promotional
prospects, and minimal formalized training opportunities relative to other firms (Matlay, 2002;
Memili, Misra, Chang, & Chrisman, 2013; Neckebrouck, Schulze, & Zellweger, 2017). These
behaviors not only decrease the incentives to join family firms, they may also foster injustice
perceptions that further persuade nonfamily candidates to shun these firms because of the
perceived preferential treatment toward family members (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006;
Chrisman, Devaraj, & Patel, 2017; McCarthy et al., 2017). Thus the general ability of SME
family firms to successfully utilize nonfamily personnel has been questioned (Chrisman, Memili,
& Misra, 2014).
The present research challenges these prevailing assumptions regarding nonfamily
employee utilization by examining the recruitment and selection practices of these firms from a
relational perspective. Distinct from prior nonfamily research, I argue that firms with greater
family essence attain heightened firm performance by utilizing distinctive employee recruitment
and selection behaviors. Specifically, I contend that these firms will utilize owner referrals when
hiring nonfamily to maintain their competitive advantage. Recognized as a predictor of
differential and unique behaviors among family firms, firms with high family essence are defined
as those with transgenerational succession intentions and a strong commitment to the family unit
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). In particular, I argue that enhanced family essence
2

will encourage family firms to utilize referrals in nonfamily recruitment and selection. In turn,
as I outline below, I contend this will positively contribute to firm performance by allowing these
firms to attain motivated and culturally-fit nonfamily personnel who will help them achieve their
goals. By employing their social relationships, these firms may therefore be able to attract and
motivate nonfamily personnel that fit their needs and will help improve firm performance.
By utilizing agency theory (Akerlof, 1970) as a means for understanding why family
essence leads firms to utilize referrals in selection, I address a gap in the literature as to how
family firms successfully utilize nonfamily employees to improve performance. Put simply,
despite prevailing assumptions that family essence may hinder their ability to utilize nonfamily
personnel, I hypothesize that firms with heightened family essence can successfully leverage
their owner’s social networks to identify suitable nonfamily personnel.
Model Overview
The conceptual model presented for this paper is shown in Figure 1 below. First, I
propose that family essence will directly influence firm performance. Second, this study also
hypothesizes that family essence will be directly related to the use of owner referrals in
recruitment. Third, I hypothesize that referral utilization is directly related to firm performance.
Finally, I hypothesize that the relationship between family essence and firm performance will be
mediated by the use of owner referrals in recruitment.

3
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Figure 1

Conceptual Model

Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this study was to investigate how family firms use human resource
practices to attain higher performance. These firms’ lack of pecuniary and nonpecuniary
incentives will likely generate nonfamily agency conflicts (Chrisman et al., 2014; Vandekerkhof,
Steijvers, & Hendriks, 2015), while the informal environments typical of these firms necessitate
nonfamily steward-like behaviors (Klein & Bell, 2007; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). With few
incentives to encourage productivity and more informal environments that make monitoring
more difficult, this helps illustrate why the involvement of nonfamily members in family firms is
deemed one of the most challenging issues confronting family firms (Chua et al., 2003). In an
attempt to partially describe how the unique governance, goals and resources of family firms will
shape and inform their recruitment practices, this dissertation applies agency theory (Akerlof,
4

1970; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) to investigate the manner in which family
firms will utilize distinct practices in recruiting nonfamily employees.
Owner referral utilization – the process of firm owners communicating job openings to
their social network members - may lessen the likelihood of relationship termination,
opportunistic behavior, uncooperative practices and conflicts (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Schlachter
& Pieper, 2017). Because the referred individual and the hiring firm have greater confidence in
each other, this can facilitate interpersonal exchanges by fostering collaborative environments
between individuals or groups so that high risk, long-term engagements can be more readily
established and justified (Hashim & Tan, 2015; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). This suggests that
referrals can enable a family firm to successfully include nonfamily members and thus improve
their overall performance, utilizing their social capital as the mechanism by which these
individuals can be obtained by the firm. Social capital refers to the resources available to an
individual or group from their network of relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Social
capital will create ties to family firms that will facilitate the circulation of information beyond
the confines of the firm. As will be elaborated, firms marked by high family essence are well
positioned to utilize their social relationships to obtain quality employees via referrals.
Utilizing agency theory, I therefore propose that, because family firms face attenuated
labor pools, they will likely confront extensive information asymmetries when relying upon
formalized recruitment methods. Further, these firms will also generally have heightened social
capital that will make more informal recruitment methods such as member referrals both more
attractive and advantageous for these firms. Member referrals denote the practice of firm
members communicating information about a job opening to other individuals within their social
network (Schlachter & Pieper, 2017). Acting as a screening device to minimize information
5

asymmetries, referrals allow for the transfer of credible information between parties at a low cost
(Trusov, Bucklin, & Pauwels, 2009). Further, the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors by the
referred party are reduced because such actions would threaten the relationship with the referring
individual (Chollet, Géraudel, & Mothe, 2014; Podolny, 1994; Uzzi, 1997). Referrals may
consequently be best utilized in high ambiguity and high-risk recruitment situations. These
referrals can similarly act to transmit much needed credibility between a candidate and a
potential employer. Specifically, this suggests owner referrals - the practice of firms utilizing an
employee recommendation from the owner of the firm - may be particularly applicable to low
trust contexts such as family firm recruitment that can foster agency conflicts because of owner’s
increased knowledge of both candidates and the needs of the firm (Akerlof, 1970; Chrisman et
al., 2014).
In this dissertation, I propose that utilizing owner referrals in selection provides
performance benefits in family firms because of the unique combination of their goals, resources
and governance structures. Therefore, this dissertation addresses three primary questions:
1) Are firms with greater family essence more likely to utilize owner referrals in
selection?
2) Does the utilization of owner referrals lead to higher firm performance?
3) Does owner referral utilization mediate the relationship between family essence and
firm performance?
The first research question concerns whether family essence contributes to greater owner
referral utilization among these firms. When a firm is controlled by a dominant family coalition
with transgenerational succession intentions, research contends that these firms will exert
different behaviors or pursue different goals than nonfamily firms or family firms without such
6

intentions (Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012). I propose that one such behavior will be the
recruitment practices among these firms, rendering these firms more apt to utilize informal
recruitment practices as family essence in the firm intensifies. This is because owner referrals
may be better suited than other methods to facilitate their ability to identify committed agents
who are aligned with the values and aspirations of the family and firm. With greater family
essence, these firms are likely to confront heightened challenges in utilizing formal recruitment
methods that may discourage these firms from using them. Instead, as will be elaborated,
utilizing member referrals may better position these firms to identify individuals who will assist
them in achieving their goals.
The second research question addresses whether or not owner referrals yield greater
performance benefits among these firms. Because of the relational connection that may exist
between referred owners and firm members, fidelity may be more readily attained. This may be
especially crucial in the family firm context because of their limited use of pecuniary incentives.
Therefore, to obtain an accurate reflection of the benefits of prioritizing referrals in the selection
of nonfamily members, I test whether doing so leads to performance improvements in family
firms (See Figure 1). By considering the impact of hiring owner referred nonfamily members,
this study could advance knowledge on how family firms can maintain their governance
structures, and, ultimately, their firm performance, while both utilizing outsiders and
maintaining a commitment to the family unit in the firm.
Relatedly, the third research question addresses whether owner referral utilization
mediates the relationship between high family essence firms and performance. As noted,
referral utilization is a cost-effective means for attaining quality personnel. This is in part
because referral utilization helps mitigate information asymmetries and conflicts of interest that
7

plague hiring practices (Pieper, 2015). These issues are considered primary challenges for
family firms in selecting employees, causing an adverse selection problem – wherein a firm
unknowingly contracts with an agent unsuited for the job – for these firms (Chrisman et al.,
2014; Vandekerkhof et al., 2015; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Thus, firms high in family essence
may be able to attain quality personnel via referrals that contributes to their performance. Thus,
the benefits of owner referral utilization combined with the unique challenges these firms face
in hiring indicates that referral utilization may intervene in the relationship between family
essence and firm performance.
This study intends to advance research on nonfamily members in family firms. It
addresses a central topic for how family firms can utilize outsiders to benefit firm performance
and could have important implications for both research and practitioners. Even though recent
research on nonfamily members in family firms has intensified (Tabor et al., 2018), empirical
research on the unique benefits or disadvantages of differing family firm human resource
practices has been limited. This study therefore addresses an important gap in family firm
research that may be valuable to better resolving some of the ongoing debates in the literature
about the expected utility and anticipated goal alignment of nonfamily members in the family
firm (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010; Vardaman, Allen, & Rogers, 2018). Further, this
investigation will provide new insights on if or how the unique goals, governance and resources
of family firms influence their human resource practices.
This dissertation offers three contributions. First, this study intends to offer an
explanation for how firms high in family essence can successfully employ nonfamily members
despite perceived conflicts of interest. Due to limited controls and lessened incentives, this
context presents a situation wherein the firm’s social network may be the most viable avenue for
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identifying and attaining qualified human capital outside the family. In particular, I intend to
demonstrate that family firms utilizing owner referrals will outperform family firms that
prioritize other recruitment methods. Second, this study offers new insights into how small firms
can better overcome challenges related to limited resources or capabilities. By utilizing social
relationships and employing outsiders with whom a pre-existing relationship may already be
present, these firms can potentially overcome challenges common to many professionalizing
small firms.
Third, this study brings increased attention to the importance and difficulty of ensuring
nonfamily employee reliability in the family firm context (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, & Chua,
2010). In light of the resource limitations and family-centered behaviors of these firms, family
business research has shown a lack of clarity as to how the nonfamily employee arrangement can
successfully work in light of the uncertainty likely to fester (Akerlof, 1970; Chrisman et al.,
2014). Family firms often have limited pecuniary incentives available to attract nonfamily
candidates (Neckebrouck et al., 2017). This can cause many qualified candidates to self-select
out of the labor in order to pursue more profitable opportunities (Chrisman et al., 2017). This can
create a shrunken labor pool with a disproportionate number of low quality candidates (‘lemons’)
because of labor sorting (Akerlof, 1970; Chrisman et al., 2014).
While some researchers have suggested the solution to this problem of adverse selection
in family firms is for firms such as these to utilize incentives or monitoring/evaluation practices
to elicit cooperation (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Chua, Chrisman & Bergiel, 2009; Eisenhardt,
1989) and others have emphasized how mutually beneficial relationships can be fostered with
nonfamily employees by firm leaders after they join the firm through altruism (Kulkarni &
Ramamoorthy, 2017; Pearson & Marler, 2010), an alternative and potentially more fruitful
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explanation may be by examining recruitment and selection (Ployhart, Schmitt, & Tippins,
2017). Recruitment theory (Schneider, 1987) indicates that labor sorting in firms will lead to
homogenous firms composed of individuals aligned with the firms’ goals, suggesting that these
firms are likely to resolve some of these challenges through their recruitment and selection
processes. Therefore, this research uniquely describes how family firm behaviors and structures
uniquely influence their recruitment practices and can lay a foundation for successfully including
nonfamily in the firm.
This dissertation uniquely examines family firm recruitment practices sources. In light of
the extensive volume of research on both family business and recruitment to date, it is surprising
that little attention has been paid to the antecedents of family firm utilization of nonfamily
members (Tabor et al., 2018). By explicating the unique mechanisms that can elicit goal
alignment between both nonfamily members and family firms despite perceived conflicts of
interests, this model contributes to a deeper understanding of how family firms can leverage their
resources to attain improved financial performance even as they professionalize.
Presentation Format
This dissertation proposal is presented in six chapters. The dissertation follows the format
of the traditional multi-chapter dissertation. Following this first chapter, which introduces the
proposed study and contribution, the second chapter present a review of the literature relevant to
the proposed study and an exposition of the literature that advances the arguments of this
proposal, theoretically developing the different proposed hypotheses. This chapter likewise
includes an explanation of the theoretical framework that serves as a lens through which to
assess this topic. A presentation of the proposed hypotheses linking family firm behaviors and
characteristics with the anticipated recruitment practices of these firms is also provided. The
10

third chapter presents the proposed research design and methodology of the dissertation. The
study variables are presented including a discussion of the sample of firms utilized for the study.
Likewise, the measures and survey for the study are included. Following this, the data collection
procedure for the study and analysis of the results is described. Finally, a discussion of the results
and conclusion are presented.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW, MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
This chapter starts with a summary of the literature on nonfamily employees and referral
utilization in recruitment. It then follows with a discussion of the theoretical model and a
development of the respective hypotheses.
Literature Review
Nonfamily Employees
Constituting the majority of family firm members, nonfamily employees are vital to the
success of professionalized family firms (Mass Mutual, 2007; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008).
However, while research has found evidence that nonfamily employees positively contribute to
the financial performance of family firms (Fang, Randolph, Memili, & Chrisman, 2015; Sciascia
& Mazzola, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), some research has called into question the ability
of these firms to successfully recruit quality nonfamily members (Chrisman et al., 2014). This
research has suggested that heightened family involvement in the firm may limit the ability of
these firms to successfully compete in the labor market and attain quality nonfamily personnel
(Hauswald, Hack, Kellermanns, & Patzelt, 2015; Managers & Chrisman, 2013; Vandekerkhof et
al., 2015).
Characterized by the unique combination of the family unit with a business entity,
research has well established that family firms value and often prioritize noneconomic goals
intended to benefit family members (Gómez-mejía, Haynes, Núñez-nickel, & Jacobson, 2007).
12

The attainment of these goals fosters an affective endowment, termed socioemotional wealth,
that is typified by the family’s aspiration for long-term control and influence over the firm across
multiple generations, the benefiting of family members through pecuniary and nonpecuniary
remunerations and emotional attachment and identification with the firm (Berrone, Cruz, &
Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). Although these benefits encourage and
better ensure the family’s continued involvement and commitment to the firm, encouraging these
members to act akin to firm stewards who identify the firm as an extension of themselves
(Carney, 2005; De Massis, Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2013; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, &
Scholnick, 2008), these same pursuits can deter nonfamily members from either joining or
serving the interests of firm owners (Vandekerkhof et al., 2015). Research has found that family
firms typically offer lower compensation, promotional prospects, training opportunities, and
compensatory benefits in relation to their nonfamily counterparts (Memili et al., 2013;
Neckebrouck et al., 2017; Verbeke & Kano, 2010).
These proclivities stem in part from the common tendency of family firms to prioritize
family members over nonfamily members (Chrisman et al., 2014). While these practices are to
some extent a means to simply benefit family over nonfamily, they also result from a perception
that family members are de facto more loyal and committed firm members than nonfamily
employees (Miller et al., 2008; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). This generates a type of unfairness
termed bifurcation bias wherein family members can receive preferential treatment since they are
perceived as more vital and necessary to a firm’s success than nonfamily members. Because of
this, some research suggests that organizational injustice perceptions among nonfamily members
at many family firms may be high (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Barnett, Long, & Marler,
2012; Verbeke & Kano, 2012).
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Therefore, because family firms often lack the incentives to attract quality nonfamily
members, this is anticipated to siphon off qualified nonfamily candidates from the labor pool
who instead pursue positions at other firms (Chrisman et al., 2017). This can create a ‘lemons’
market for family firms who experience a shrunken labor pool with a skewed proportion of lower
quality candidates due to labor sorting (Akerlof, 1970; Chrisman et al., 2014). Further, these
same drawbacks may limit the ability of these firms to motivate the nonfamily members they do
attain (Vandekerkhof et al., 2015). Thus there is a high likelihood that these firms will be highly
susceptible to attracting opportunistic or unqualified nonfamily candidates typified by low ability
and/or effort (Williamson, 1979). Empirical findings seem to suggest this possibility. Both
Hauswald et al. (2015) and Block et al. (2016) found that low ambition, risk intolerant
individuals prefer the family firm context. Thus the propensity of these firms for attracting
opportunists, idlers or lower quality employees seems pertinent (Karra, Tracey, & Phillips,
2006).
This may pose a real challenge for family firms. Not only will lower quality human
capital limit family firm performance potential (Kim & Ployhart, 2014), but the governance
structures of these firms are often designed to host employees who are both self-motivated and
committed to firm goals (Neubaum, Thomas, Dibrell, & Craig, 2017). Family firms are often less
formal and bureaucratic and thus engage in less monitoring and evaluation of members (Chua et
al., 2009). This allows family firms to better maintain a more family-like ethos even when
expanding their personnel beyond the nuclear family (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Pearson
& Marler, 2010). Although these firm structures may attract nonfamily members likely to thrive
in these environments, they are simultaneously expected to attract individuals who may take
advantage of these environments (Karra et al., 2006; Klein & Bell, 2007).
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Because of this, research generally recommends more widespread use of costly contracts,
incentives, and monitoring devices to minimize the negative impact of low skill and unmotivated
nonfamily employees (Chua et al., 2003). However, not only do many smaller family firms lack
the ability and willingness to instill these, overuse may further hasten distrust between owners
and employees such that these problems may become exacerbated (Chua et al., 2003; Corbetta &
Salvato, 2004). Additionally, this may lead to more generic firm environments and firm
structures that make these firms less distinctive and attractive to outsiders, undermining any
derived competitive advantage from their flexible and family-like environments (James, Jennings
& Jennings, 2017; Klein & Bell, 2007; Madison et al., 2017; Stewart & Hitt, 2012).
However, despite these extensive challenges, there is strong evidence that nonfamily
members positively contribute to the success of family firms. In their study consisting primarily
of family firms with less than 250 employees, Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) found that family
firms with nonfamily managers had better performance than firms with family managers.
Research has likewise shown that family firms with dispersed ownership or in more technical
industries benefited from nonfamily leadership (Carney, 1998; Lin & Hu, 2007; Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta, & Pittino, 2014; Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013).
Consistent with these findings, Barth et al. (2005) found that nonfamily managers are generally
more productive than their family counterparts. Additionally, underperforming family firms are
more inclined to hire nonfamily CEOs than those with strong performance, suggesting that
nonfamily CEOs are hired because of expectations of improved firm performance (Bocatto,
Gispert, & Rialp, 2010). Finally, other research has found that the coexistence of nonfamily
managers with family managers in a firm improves performance despite the possibility of
conflicting factions forming (Minichilli, Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010). This research thus
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suggests that family firms are able to successfully utilize nonfamily personnel despite their
extensive limitations. An overview of the research related to nonfamily employees is provided in
Table 1.

Sample Research on Nonfamily Member Involvement in Family Firms
Source

Theoretical
Lens

Sample

Key Findings

Barnett &
Kellermanns
(2006)

Fairness theory

Conceptual

Family firms (FFs) with high family involvement are perceived as unfair to
Nonfamily (NF) employees; firms with moderate levels of family
involvement have positive perceptions of fairness from NF employees.

Barnett, Long
& Marler
(2012)

Social exchange
theory

Conceptual

FFs characterized by weak visions & restricted exchange will have negative
justice climates for NF managers. Conversely, firms with strong family
visions & generalized exchange will have positive justice climates.

Block (2010)

Agency and
stewardship
theory
Agency theory

414 S&P 500
firms

Because of family reputation concerns, FFs are less likely to downsize than
nonfamily firms.

Conceptual

Because NF managers generally are expected to have shorter stints at FFs
than their family member counterparts, compensation contracts should be
designed to align NF managers’ goals with the family's long-term goals.

Chrisman,
Memili &
Misra (2014)

Agency theory

Conceptual

Because of FF tendency to offer reduced compensation, stock options,
promotional opportunities & incentives, FFs tend to hire lower-quality NF
managers while still maintaining high NF performance expectations.

Chua,
Chrisman &
Bergiel (2009)

Agency theory

Conceptual

FFs tend to be altruistic and biased toward family members but not
nonfamily members in performance evaluations, compensation, etc.

Chua,
Chrisman &
Sharma (2003)

Agency theory

272 Canadian
family firms

Agency problems occur in FFs as they employ NF managers. The extent of
these concerns is driven by the size of the firm, the number of NF managers
involved and the importance of the NF managers to the firm's success.

Cruz, GomezMejia &
Becerra
(2010)
Davis, Allen
& Hayes
(2010)

Agency theory

122 family
firms

CEO perceptions of trust and benevolence of TMT impact agency contracts
and agency structures.

Stewardship
theory

A discrepancy exists between NF and family employees in terms of value
commitment, trust and agency perceptions. This discrepancy can be partially
alleviated through perceived stewardship.

Ensley,
Pearson &
Sadeshmukh
(2007)

Upper echelon
theory

Gomez-Mejia,
LarrazaKintana &
Makri (2003)

Agency theory

366 surveys of
family and NF
members of
315 family
firms
112 family
firms and 88
nonfamily firms
from Inc. 500
in 1996, 1999
& 2003.
253 publicly
listed family
firms.

Block (2011)

Pay dispersion in FFs has a more negative impact on behavioral dynamics
than in NF firms because of the group dynamics within multiplex FFs.

NF managers are paid relatively more than family managers, a discrepancy
that decreases as the family’s ownership increases and R&D investment
increases.
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Table 1

(continued)

Karra, Tracey
& Phillips
(2006)

Agency theory

Case study of
one Turkish
firm

Altruistic behavior by principals can lead to reciprocity from NF employees
for finite periods of time, minimizing agency costs especially among those
with quasi-kinship ties.

Lee, Lim &
Lim (2003)

Transaction cost
theory

Conceptual

FFs' idiosyncratic cultures and knowledge bases make family succession
more necessary even when the proposed successor is moderately less
competent than the other alternatives.

McConaughy
(2000)

N/A

Nonfamily CEOs tend to receive greater base pay than family CEOs yet
their performance pay tends to be lower.

Memili,
Misra, Chang
& Chrisman
(2013)
Mitchell,
Morse &
Sharma (2003)

Socioemotional
wealth

82 US family
firms (45 with
family CEOs,
37 with nonfamily CEOs)
2,019 US small
family firms

Transaction
cognition theory

Conceptual

Because of the unique interaction of the family and business, nonfamily
employees face cognitive challenges in successfully navigating the
idiosyncratic cultures of FFs.

Pearson &
Marler (2010)

Leader-member
exchange

Conceptual

Sciasca &
Mazzola
(2008)
Stewart & Hitt
(2012)

Agency and
stewardship
theory
N/A

620 Italian
firms

Vandekerkhof,
Steijvers,
Hendriks &
Voordeckers
(2015)

Upper echelon
theory

145 private
Belgian family
firms

FFs’ leadership engaging in stewardship behaviors (collective serving,
intrinsic motivation, commitment to values) can create a culture of
stewardship within the FF, producing environments of trust, respect and
obligation with NF employees.
In distinguishing between NF management and ownership, they conclude
that nonfamily managers improve economic performance in spite of any
additional agency costs.
There are a multitude of reasons that FFs tend to be slow in
professionalizing including concerns about hindering entrepreneurial
capabilities, idiosyncratic methods of FF have proven effectiveness, trust
among employees, etc.
As SEW becomes more primary to a FF’s goals, the effectiveness of NF
managers decreases with regards to firm innovativeness, firm
internationalization and firm size.

Verbeke &
Kano (2012)

Transaction cost
theory

Conceptual

Conceptual

Family influence and control along with intra-family succession intentions
are negatively correlated with FF propensity to use incentives such as
bonuses and profit sharing to compensate NF managers.

FFs often treat NF employees as outsiders' with commodity status while
family members are valued by the firm (bifurcation bias). Oftentimes, this
results in certain features of NF contracts being ignored or dismissed by FF
during employment.

Member Referrals
One explanation for the above may be the use of member referrals in nonfamily
recruitment by these firms. Member referrals refers to the practice of firm members
communicating information about a job opening to other individuals within their social network
(Schlachter & Pieper, 2017). Recruitment research has established that all types of firms utilize

17

and often prefer member referrals to other types of recruitment practices (Kirnan, Farley, &
Geisinger, 1989). Upwards of 50% of firm openings are filled by workers referred by friends,
family or other acquaintances while approximately 70% of firms have programs that encourage
members to refer openings to qualified members of their social networks (Burks, Cowgill,
Hoffman, & Housman, 2015; Galenianos, 2013; Granovetter, 1996; Pieper, 2015; Topa, 2011).
Hiring via member referrals offers numerous advantages to firms both in the form of costsavings and improved performance. In a study of call center employees, Fernandez et al. (2000)
found that firms saved money when hiring referred candidates due to lessened screening,
recruitment and training costs. Likewise, Galenianos (2014) indicates that referred employees are
hired more quickly than non-referred members. This results in part from referred candidates
more readily accepting job offers than those chosen from an at-large candidate pool (Breaugh,
Greising, Taggart, & Chen, 2003). This suggests that firms may be able to exert less energy and
effort when hiring referred candidates. These benefits may be intensified among smaller firms or
those with less ubiquitous reputations because hiring through social networks may preclude the
costly need to create a positive brand image through advertising or publicity that can be
necessary to attract applicants (Collins & Stevens, 2002; Ployhart, 2006). Thus research has
recognized referrals as a cost-effective recruitment method for all types of firms but especially
among firms with less name recognition (Pieper, 2015).
Research has likewise linked referrals with improved worker quality and efficiency. Brown et al.
(2012) observed that referred employees typically have higher productivity and longer tenures,
particularly among lower skill employees. Relatedly, researchers have found that referred
employees have greater job satisfaction and engage in more pro-organizational behaviors
(Granovetter, 1996; Pieper, 2015; Simon & Warner, 1992). These features in part result from
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both the indirect and direct relational benefits offered via referrals. Utilizing member referrals
indicates that there is a built-in relational connection available to these new firm members. The
personal connection with the referring member solidifies initial confidence among referred
candidates in the firm, thus establishing an emotional connection to the organization that is more
likely to endure (Ramaseshan, Wirtz & Dominik, 2017; Van Den Bulte & Wuyts, 2007). Brown
et al. (2012) found that referred members have lower turnover rates than other employees. This
in part results from the strong relational connection offered to referred members. For instance,
Fernandez et al. (2000) found that referred members are more likely to leave a firm when the
referrer themselves leaves. Similarly, turnover among referrers has been associated with
decreased productivity among referred members (Castilla, 2005). This indicates that this
relationship is integral to the motivation and commitment of these new members, enriching the
experience of being in a firm simply because these individuals enjoy working with acquaintances
and friends (Fernandez et al., 2000). This further suggests that the referrer-referred relationship
can act as an informal or tacit type of monitoring mechanism that discourages improper behavior
among referred members who seek to maintain a strong relationship with the referrer (Heath,
2016). Thus in general referred members may be more likely to exert greater effort than other
members of a firm.
Additionally, utilizing member referrals fosters improved intra-firm relationships that
extend beyond the referrer themselves. This is particularly true with regards to the vital
relationship these members have with their supervisor. For instance, Yahiaoui (2015)
demonstrated that referrals lead to a greater emotional connection between supervisors and
employees. She indicates that supervisors are more trusting of employees referred to them while
these same employees show greater commitment because they are often referred to the firm by a
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trusted individual. Supervisor trust may therefore result from expectations that referred members
will be less tempted to engage in shirking or counterproductive behaviors due to social pressures
and heightened dedication to firm goals. Relatedly, Castilla (2005) found that members hired
from within a firm’s social network were more sensitive to supervisor perceptions of their work
because subpar performance or opportunistic behaviors could cause them social impairment.
This indicates that social exchange will more readily occur between referred members and
supervisors, increasing the potential for a strong working relationship.
Additionally, this further indicates that an embedded firm member will be able to assist
these individuals in adapting to unfamiliar terrain, better positioning referred members to adapt
to a new firm context and more readily navigate the idiosyncrasies common among many firms
(Mitchell, Morse, & Sharma, 2003; Rynes, 1989). This is likely compounded by some of the
unique phenomena associated with social networks. Referred members are expected to have
similar attributes and characteristics as the referring member due to the homophily that generally
exists within social networks (McPherson et al., 2001). This suggests that cultural fit will more
promptly occur among referred candidates. This is particularly likely since latent qualities such
as cultural fit may be difficult to discern through formalized recruitment practices such as resume
screening or structured interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2007), suggesting that formalized
recruitment methods may be limited in their ability to ensure cultural fit among new members.
However, perhaps most importantly, referrals may help address one of the most central
challenges of firm recruitment: uncertainty (Rees, 1966; Stigler, 1962). Comprehensive
information about a candidate is impossible for firms to attain due to bounded rationality
(Williamson, 1979). Likewise, ambiguity regarding working conditions at less well known firms
may afflict candidates as well (Breaugh, 2008). This indicates that information asymmetries may
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negatively affect both firms and candidates in the recruitment process. Because of this, the
likelihood of poorly matched candidates and firms is increased (Datcher, 1983; Fernandez et al.,
2000). As information asymmetries are magnified, this problem is likely exacerbated as
candidates and firms may grow increasingly unable to discern if they are a good match with the
organization or individual in question. Thus the likelihood of candidates withdrawing from the
applicant process or firms foregoing the employment of new members is heightened (Chrisman
et al., 2014; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005).
However, referring members may help resolve this central challenge by acting as
intermediaries between candidates and firms (Pieper, 2015). There are several means through
which this can occur. First, referred candidates will be more privy to what working in a firm
actually entails due to their relational connection within the firm. Fernandez and Weinberg
(1997) noted that candidates with a personal contact embedded in the firm may be able to gather
information about a job on the ‘intensive margins’ that may deepen knowledge about a position.
This helps inform candidates regarding their fitness for a position, better allowing them to
discern whether they should self-select into the recruitment process. This additional information
about what a position entails may further explain why referred members are less likely to leave a
firm as they have more realistic expectations about a position (Wanous, 1977). In contrast, while
formalized practices can assist in providing some information about a firm, these processes may
be more limited in their effectiveness.
Similarly, firms themselves will gain much needed knowledge about candidates by hiring
via referrals. While practices such as signaling and resume screening may assist somewhat in
minimizing the likelihood of unfit candidates joining the firm, these are unlikely to be sufficient
in mitigating the problems associated with bounded rationality and information asymmetries
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(Chrisman et al., 2014; Greer et al., 2016; Spence, 1973). This is especially true since faking and
deception by candidates in recruitment is a well-recognized problem, increasing the
informational challenges these firms may face in hiring (Alliger, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell, 1996;
Levashina & Campion, 2007).
However, member referrals may be useful for addressing these problems. When a firm
member refers a candidate, this member’s reputation is often at stake (Pieper, 2015). Thus
members are incentivized to vet candidates prior to recommending them. This often means that
member referrals result after relational trust has been established over time through recurrent
interactions between these individuals (Klotz, da Motta Veiga, Buckley, & Gavin, 2013; Kramer,
1999). These referrals therefore typically result only once a candidate is perceived to match the
needed qualities to succeed within a given firm context. These relationships therefore allow firms
to gain tacit information about a candidate because of the extensiveness of knowledge often
available about these candidates. Examples of discernable qualities may include trustworthiness,
loyalty or work ethic, all of which may be difficult to assess through more formalized
recruitment methods.
Member referrals are therefore expected to lessen the information asymmetries existing
between both candidates and the firm than that availed through formal recruitment practices. Put
simply, member referrals may better allow firms and candidate to preserve intra-relational trust,
better resolving the extensive information asymmetries likely to exist in these contexts (Akerlof,
1970). Thus member referred candidates will be less likely to self-select out of the labor pool,
increasing the likelihood of these firms successfully attaining quality human capital (Chrisman et
al., 2014; Yakubovich & Lup, 2006). It will also ensure that candidates better suited for the
firm’s context and needs can be more easily identified, thus lowering the risks associated with
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hiring (Fernandez et al., 2000; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Therefore, in summary, leveraging
member referrals in recruitment may offer extensive benefits to firms, particularly in minimizing
the information asymmetries that can afflict firms hiring new personnel. A brief overview of the
literature on member referral utilization in firm recruitment is provided in Table 2.2.
Sample Research on Member Referrals in Recruitment
Source

Theoretical
Lens

Sample

Key Findings

Beaman &
Magruder
(2012)

N/A

155 Indian
households

Brown,
Setren &
Topa
(2012)

N/A

Burks,
Cowgill,
Hoffman &
Housman
(2015)

N/A

Castilla
(2005)

Social
enrichment

Cheung &
Gui (2006)

Exchange theory

62,127
applicants to
positions at a
US
corporation.
Over
1,750,000
applicants to
positions at
nine US
firms (tech,
call centers
and
trucking).
4,165
applicants to
positions at a
US calling
center.
835 Chinese
workers

High ability employees often have useful hiring information about the abilities of
members of their social network that can be utilized in employment decisions. However,
social networks can provide some incentives to refer unqualified workers for a job,
making it necessary for employers to counterbalance these incentives through their
screening efforts.
Referred workers are more likely to be hired, experience an initial wage advantage that
dissipates over time and have longer firm tenures.

Dustmann,
Glitz,
Schönberg
& Brücker
(2016)

N/A

1,373
German
workers

Referred employees receive higher wages and are less likely to turnover than other
nonreferred employees. These effects are stronger at the beginning of job tenure but
dissipate with tenure. Authors conclude that referrals mitigate informational deficiencies
in hiring, leading to greater firm and employee productivity.

Fernandez,
Castilla &
Moore
(2000)

Richer pool,
better match and
social enrichment

325 workers
at a US
calling
center.

Employers who utilize employee social capital to hire new employees can experience
significant economic returns. This results from referred applicants improving the
applicant pool since these firms would likely be unaware of these prospects otherwise,
the greater likelihood of homophily among referred employees and referring members
only recommending qualified applicants due to reputational concerns.

Fernandez
&
Weinberg
(1997)

N/A

2,499
employees at
a US retail
bank.

Referred applicants experience advantages at both the interview and job-offer stages of
recruitment. This research further finds that referred applicants have more appropriate
resumes than do nonreferred applicants, indicating that referred applicants are
prescreened by referring members before recommendation.

Despite comparable abilities and skillsets, referred members are more likely to receive
and accept job offers. Referred members receive greater wages, are less likely to quit and
produce greater profits for their respective firms.

Posthire social processes make referred employees more likely to outperform
nonreferred employees. Empirical findings support that referred employees are more
productive and less likely to turnover.

Referring via strong ties leads to both financial and psychological rewards (i.e. job
satisfaction). Referred candidates with higher socioeconomic status provide greater
utility to referrers because of the increased resources these individuals can provide.
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Table 2

(continued)

Galenianos
(2013)

N/A

Archival
data for 15
US
industries

Use of referrals in hiring in an industry is positively associated with the speed with
which vacancies are filled.

Heath
(2016)

N/A

1,395
Bangladeshi
households

Firms hiring via referrals may minimize moral hazard because of their ability to punish
the referral provider if the referred employees has low productivity.

Hsieh &
Chen
(2011)

Relationshiporientation
theory

316
Taiwanese
workers

Use of referrals in hiring can sometimes lead to lower person-organization fit since the
referring member may not provide essential or accurate information to the referred
candidate.

Kirnan,
Farley &
Geisinger
(1989)

Prescreening
hypothesis

Referred candidates for a position had higher quality and were more likely to stay with
the firm. These candidates were also more likely to be selected for a position. However,
utilizing referrals in hiring led to fewer female and minority hires, suggesting that
informal recruitment methods may have adverse effects on protected groups.

Merluzzi &
Sterling
(2017)

N/A

Pieper
(2015)

Better match and
social enrichment
theories

Pieper,
Trevor,
Weller &
Duchon
(2017)
Schmutte
(2015)

Social
enrichment

20,576
applicants to
a US
insurance
company.
16,000
employees at
a large US
corporation.
386
referringreferred pairs
at a US
calling
center.
265 referring
employees in
a US calling
center.

Research finds that workers are more likely to change jobs and join a high-paying firm if
their neighbors are employed in a high-paying firm. Also finds evidence that local
referral networks help match high-ability workers with high-paying firms.

Simon &
Warner
(1992)

N/A

1,524,733,93
4 matched
pairs of US
workers
from sample
of annual job
changers.
18,594 US
engineers.

N/A

Referral based hiring can lead to unique advantages for minorities compared to those
hired without a referral. Referrals are positively associated with promotions for AfricanAmerican employees in particular. Authors posit that referrals provide a signal of
applicant quality for African-American employees.
Employees referred by high-performing employees tended to perform better but were
also more likely to turnover than referred employees from lower performing employees.
Likewise, referred employees were more likely to turnover when the referring member
left the firm.

Referring employees are less likely to voluntarily turnover and more likely to have better
job performance while the referred employee is working for the firm.

Old boy networks reduce employers’ uncertainty about worker productivity. Hiring
through these networks is associated with higher salaries but lower wage growth.
Likewise, hiring through these networks is associated with less turnover.

Summary of Literature Review
Family firms have unique goals, governance and resources that provide both advantages
and disadvantages for these firms relative to other firms (Chrisman & Holt, 2016). However,
how these firms can leverage their resources and minimize their limitations to successfully
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recruit and attain nonfamily personnel suited for their goals and governance structures has been
little considered in the family business literature. As our review of the literature has indicated,
prior research suggests utilizing owner referrals may be especially advantageous for these firms
because of the loose governance structures and limited incentives available for nonfamily
employees at these firms. This contention that family firms will make greater use of owner
referrals in selection comports with recruitment theory which suggests that firms will attract and
select employees who ‘fit’ their unique needs and offerings (Schneider, 1987). However, the
question now shifts to the influence this has on family firm performance. Below, I theorize that
these firms will experience benefits from utilizing their social relationships to hire nonfamily as
this will promote cooperation between nonfamily members and family firms.
Theoretical Development and Hypotheses
While all small firms may to some extent grapple with personnel challenges because of
their limited size and resources, these problems may be exacerbated in firms with heightened
family essence due to their commitment to the family unit (Botero, 2014; Chrisman et al., 2017;
Greer et al., 2016). Firms high in family essence typically prioritize noneconomic goals more
than other firms, with many of these firms placing greater value on these goals than their
economic aspirations (Chrisman et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Achieving these goals
provides emotional benefits to family firm members that ensure their long-term involvement in
the firm (Chrisman et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). However, the prioritization of these
goals may create challenges for firms employing nonfamily (Chrisman et al., 2014;
Vandekerkhof et al., 2015). Specifically, these aspirations may foster goal misalignment and
suspicion among nonfamily members, encouraging a disinclination toward pursuing firm
objectives in order to pursue selfish interests (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Madison et
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al., 2016). The deprioritization of economic goals in family firms is therefore likely to create
goal conflicts that can lead to friction between nonfamily members and firm leaders (Chrisman et
al., 2014). This suggests that the agency costs in high family essence firms that employ
nonfamily are likely to be significant (Akerlof, 1970; Chrisman et al., 2014).
To help explain how these firms can successfully utilize nonfamily despite the agency
problems associated with this employment agreement, this manuscript utilizes agency theory to
propose that firms high in family essence can utilize owner referrals in selection to minimize
such costs. Although there is widespread agreement that referrals are beneficial for all types of
firms (Fernandez et al., 2000), I assert that the unique structures, behaviors and resources of
many small to medium-sized family firms expose them to risks and limitations in recruitment
that compel these firms to prioritize strong intrapersonal relationships in the hiring process more
so than is common among other firms. As family essence increases, these challenges will only
intensify for these firms. Thus the likelihood that firms will benefit from utilizing member
referrals in recruitment increases. This will be elaborated below.
Theoretical Framework
Agency theory has been one of the most prominent theories in governance in
management for decades (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory has
been widely applied to explain how the inability of firms to create fully comprehensive contracts
can result in incongruous power dynamics in both intra and inter-firm relationships (Chrisman,
Chua, & Litz, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989). When one person (principal) enters into an agreement
with another person (agent) to perform a task(s) authoritatively, an agency relationship is created
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Firms can incur agency problems when agents pursue goals in
conflict with the principal. While often utilized to describe conflicts that may arise between
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owners and managers (Bendickson, Muldoon, Liguori, & Davis, 2016; Eisenhardt, 1989), agency
theory has also been applied to explain conflicts arising between employer and employees
(Harris & Raviv, 1978), majority and minority firm owners (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), majority
firm owners and creditors (Smith & Warner, 1979) and majority firm owners and other
stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). Thus agency theory has been used to explain a wide range of
possible conflicts of interests that can arise within a firm setting (Bendickson et al., 2016).
When goal incongruities exist between principals and agents, agency theory assumes
agents will act as self-interested, opportunistic utility-maximizers unless properly incentivized to
align their goals with the principal (Mitchell & Meacheam, 2011). Since an agent is taking on
decision-making authority for which they may not be fully compensated, they may seek
additional recompense through non-compensatory means such as shirking or free-riding (Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001). This is possible because
bounded rationality and information asymmetries inhibit principals from having complete
knowledge of an agent’s actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). The resulting actions therefore create costs
that the principal assumes while only the agent benefits. When these different goal pursuits
occur, principals must direct attention to resolving the discrepancy (Bendickson et al., 2016).
Agency problems primarily occur in two forms: adverse selection and moral hazard
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Adverse selection occurs when firms unknowingly contract with agents who
are less than suitable for the task at hand (Akerlof, 1970). Because agents may be selectively
forthcoming during recruitment procedures, principals may have limited information by which to
make selection decisions. This lack of complete information makes principals susceptible to
inappropriate hires. Therefore, bounded rationality and information asymmetries between
principals and agents may foster adverse selection even when the agent is not acting
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opportunistically (Chrisman et al., 2014). Moral hazard occurs after contracting, with agents
being unwilling to expend the needed effort to assist in goal attainment (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Thus moral hazard is often associated with opportunistic behaviors that include shirking,
free-riding, consumption of perks and hold-up. To guard against such behaviors, principals must
minimize the information asymmetries that occur within firms. However, attaining such
information can be costly (Chua et al., 2009). To do so, principals often either acquire expensive
monitoring devices or utilize incentive compensation to help align the interests of agents with
that of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The precepts of this theory have been widely applied to the family firm context
(Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016). Family members are often more committed to,
and identified with, the family firm (Davis et al., 2010; Vallejo, 2009). Because a family
member’s fate is often tied with the firm’s success or prosperity, goal alignment between family
employees and family owners is more readily achieved (Madison et al., 2016). This goal
alignment between family members and owners has been identified as central to the success of
this organizational type (Davis et al., 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Madison et al., 2016).
This alignment of goals better allows these firms to maintain a cohesive, flexible organizational
environment fastened by deep social capital among members that can potentially last for multiple
generations (Carney, 2005; Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Madison et al., 2015; Penney & Combs, 2013; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Research has suggested that heightened family essence may limit the ability of these
firms to successfully compete in the labor market, creating agency problems when employing
nonfamily (Hauswald et al., 2015; Vandekerkhof et al., 2015). Because family firms often have
limited resources and prioritize the family in personnel decisions, this is anticipated to siphon off

28

qualified nonfamily candidates who instead pursue positions at other firms (Chrisman et al.,
2017). Therefore, these firms may experience a shrunken labor pool, suggesting these firms will
be susceptible to attracting nonfamily candidates typified by low ability and/or effort (Akerlof,
1970; Chrisman et al., 2014; Williamson, 1979). Likewise, the ability for family firms to compel
the nonfamily who do join to act beyond minimal expectations may be limited. Thus while
power, in the form of incentives or punishment, is normally conceived as the primary means
through which others can be conditioned within a market economy, family firms often lack the
ability to ensure compliance through strength (Chrisman et al., 2014; Thorelli, 1986). In such
situations, cooperation is unlikely unless a positive, trusting relationship is present (Morgan &
Hunt, 1994). When this occurs, information asymmetries are more likely to be mitigated and
bounded rationality is less likely to be problematic in the recruitment and selection process
(Akerlof, 1970). Thus the probability of agency costs occurring is decreased even when power
and traditional motivational tools are under-utilized as the presence of this relationship meets a
higher-order need of these individuals (Davis et al., 1997; Maslow, 1943).
In family firms, a strong relationship with nonfamily employees will be more needed to
mitigate agency costs in light of their general tendency to eschew pecuniary incentives and
formal monitoring (Chua et al., 2009; Memili et al., 2013). However, the ability to foster these
strong relationships may be difficult after nonfamily members have joined the firm. Unless a
strong relationship is already established between these two parties, then goal conflicts may be
negatively interpreted by nonfamily members such that they perceive unfair treatment (Barnett &
Kellermanns, 2006; Celuch, Bantham, & Kasouf, 2011; Vandekerkhof et al., 2015). This results
from the family-centered objectives common among firms with high family essence that may in
certain cases lead nonfamily to sense they are treated differently (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007;
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Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Even when these family-centered behaviors are less explicit or
concerning to nonfamily members, the compensatory limitations and minimal monitoring
devices of these firms may still restrain the ability of these firms to ensure goal alignment. Thus
nonfamily involvement in the firm will foster a situation such that nonfamily employee
motivation to achieve family firm goals will be less likely. This is particularly true in light of the
information asymmetries likely to exist due to their more informal governance structures that
may better allow nonfamily to skirt duties which will, in turn, foster misgivings among family
owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Even when goal disagreements or divergences exist, nonfamily cooperation in family
firms is likely when these employees have a positive relationship with family leaders. This is
because the costs of dissolving or damaging the relationship may be perceived as high. Therefore
these divergences will not necessarily lead to an unwillingness among nonfamily members to
align with firm goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, these nonfamily members will likely interpret
family-centered objectives in a more positive light due to their positive connotations of family
members (Celuch et al., 2011; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Murray & Holmes, 1993). Accordingly,
firms high in family essence have a greater need for pre-existing relationships and/or connections
between the family firm and a nonfamily candidate to better justify the risks associated with
nonfamily inclusion. This will better ensure cooperation in light of their human resource
practices and governance structures.
Family Essence and Firm Performance
Firms high in family essence are marked by the family’s commitment to the firm and
transgenerational succession intentions (Chrisman et al., 2012). These firms are inclined to
pursue noneconomic goals that may reduce firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2012; Schulze,
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Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002). Such practices include tunneling resources to family, consuming
perquisites, and favoring kinship ties to merit in personnel decisions (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Thus their inclination to benefit the family can undermine both family and nonfamily employee
motivation to achieve firm goals by rewarding kinship ties instead of productivity (Verbeke &
Kano, 2012). This can create unique agency costs in family firms that discourage family and
nonfamily goal alignment (Chrisman et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, there are some indications in the literature that firms high in family essence
may in fact experience superior financial performance despite these proclivities (Debicki,
Kellermanns, Chrisman, Pearson, & Spencer, 2016). This largely results from the benefits firms
derive from transgenerational succession intentions. For many firm owners, transgenerational
succession is their foremost objective (Casson, 1999). However, to achieve this goal, firms must
entice a family successor to lead the firm. Thus, to increase the likelihood of attracting a willing
family successor to takeover and lead the firm long-term, family firm owner-managers are likely
to expend greater time, energy and resources to improve the value of the firm (Parker, 2016). In
particular, these firm leaders are likely to invest in intangible assets such as tacit knowledge, an
improved reputation and a strong culture as these resources cannot be as readily transferred to
new nonfamily owners (Lee et al., 2003; Parker, 2016). These efforts thus better ensure dynastic
family succession as selling the firm becomes less financially lucrative, encouraging family
successors to take over the business (Parker, 2016). These behaviors also help improve the
performance of these firms by enhancing their ability to motivate employees and attain new
customers (Barnett, Long, & Marler, 2012; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Debicki et
al., 2016; Pearson & Marler, 2010).
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By attracting family successors to the firm, this likewise is expected to contribute to longterm performance benefits. These family successors are expected to act as committed stewards of
the firm, improving long-term prospects (Davis et al., 2010; Madison et al., 2015). Further, the
improved firm prospects created by increased investment in the firm are likewise expected to
further motivate family successors as they are likely to experience greater rewards from their
efforts (Parker, 2016). This includes increased effort and more effective monitoring of
employees because of the improved incentives to promote firm productivity (James, 1999). Thus,
transgenerational succession intentions are expected to improve firm performance. Taken
together, this indicates that high family essence is likely to be associated with improved financial
performance. Therefore, my first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Family essence will be positively associated with firm performance.
Family Essence and Member Referral Utilization
The above highlights how greater family essence may lead to firm performance benefits
(Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Martin & Gomez-Mejia, 2016; Miller et al., 2008). However, I
suggest that a missing link in understanding this relationship is considering how these firms
choose to incorporate nonfamily personnel into their firms. Drawing on agency theory, I hold
that family essence can provide an advantage for human capital when certain recruitment
methods are used. Specifically, I hypothesize that family essence contributes to firm
performance through firm utilization of owner referrals to attain nonfamily human capital.
While all types of firms are inclined to make use of referrals in hiring, it is argued here
that greater family essence will lead to even greater owner referral utilization because of the
unique advantages offered via referrals to these firms (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De
Castro, 2011; Pieper, 2015). Because of their susceptibility to hiring ‘lemons,’ the competitive
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advantage of family firms can be threatened by firms high in family essence when involving
nonfamily (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2014). Transgenerational succession
intentions, unilateral control and influence over the firm, maintaining a family-like firm culture
and a strong reputation in the community all can be negatively impacted by poor fitting or
deviant nonfamily employees (Berrone et al., 2012; Dunlop & Lee, 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007). Each of these has been identified as a primary source of family firm competitive
advantage suggesting that the involvement of nonfamily in the firm could potentially hinder
performance (Carney, 2005; Chrisman & Holt, 2016; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Owner referrals in particular may be especially advantageous as these individuals will
have greater insights into a potential employee’s position to assist with achieving a firm’s unique
goals and demands (Luo & Chung, 2005). Owner referral utilization may better position these
firms to maintain their distinctive competitive advantage by helping identity individuals with
greater organizational fit and goal alignment. This results from the pre-established relationships
and connections between nonfamily members and family firms that exists through owner
referrals. For instance, Luo and Chung (2005) found that Taiwanese family firms employing
nonfamily members with whom the firm leader had a preexisting relationship led to heightened
family control and influence over the firm. They contend that these ties facilitate social exchange
and cooperation because of norms of reciprocity, implicit trust and altruism. Similarly, Cruz et
al. (2010) found that family firms used more informal contracts when hiring trusted nonfamily
members. This suggests that pre-existing relationships may preclude the necessity of more
extensive formalized governance practices.
Additionally, Karra et al. (2006) suggest that employing nonfamily with similar
backgrounds and experiences as the controlling family may better allow these firms to maintain
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their robust cultures even as they professionalize. Individuals generally form relationships with
those similar to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Thus using referrals is
likely to lead to a more monolithic organization (Taber & Hendricks, 2003). Further, because
providing a referral represents a potential risk to the reputation of the referring employee, they
are expected to assess the likelihood of cultural fit prior to making a referral (Marin, 2012). This
anticipated cultural affinity will enhance commitment between nonfamily and firm leaders since
their similarities suggest greater shared values and characteristics. This augments the likelihood
of nonfamily goal alignment and improved communication and cooperation becomes more
possible, reducing information asymmetries and bounded rationality that can cause agency costs
(Anderson & Narus, 1990; Cabrera-Suárez, Déniz-Déniz, & Martín-Santana, 2014; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).
Additionally, referred employees benefit from having a built-in social connection with
the referring owner prior to joining the firm. These relationships may be especially crucial in
firms marked by high family essence since these relationships can assist nonfamily members in
navigating the sometimes ambiguous and idiosyncratic context of these firms (Castilla, 2005;
Mitchell et al., 2003; Rynes, 1989). It also may mitigate in-group, out-group conflicts that can
arise in firms with greater family presence because of the strong dichotomy that can potentially
arise between family and nonfamily members (Ensley, Pearson, & Sardeshmukh, 2007; Verbeke
and Kano, 2012). Therefore, being referred by a member of the firm may mitigate some of the
information asymmetries, conflicts of interests and interpersonal complications that are
commonly regarded as primary challenges of small family firm recruitment (Chrisman et al.,
2014; Vandekerkhof et al., 2015; Verbeke & Kano, 2012).
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As noted in the assertions for hypothesis 1, transgenerational succession intentions are
expected to motivate firm leaders to more willingly invest effort and resources into the firm. One
way this will manifest itself is in the hiring of nonfamily personnel. Because of the benefits
available to these firms from referred employees, firms high in family essence will be more
resolved in attaining these individuals (Parker, 2016). Therefore, these firms are more likely to
dedicate effort to building relationships in the community that help them more readily attain
referrals and, likewise, to expend energy to exploit these relationships when needed. Thus, for
the aforementioned reasons, my next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Family essence will be positively associated with owner referral utilization.
Owner Referral Utilization and Firm Performance
All types of firms utilize referrals in selection in order to attain performance advantages.
The majority of firms have programs that incentivize employees to refer prospective candidates
to their firms and approximately half of all firm members learned about their current position via
informal networks (Burks et al., 2015). Firms are inclined to utilize referrals due to their
perception to be a cost-effective method to attain quality human capital (Pieper, 2015). Further,
research has indicated that referrals are associated with improved individual productivity, lower
turnover, and greater organizational commitment (Brown et al., 2012; Castilla, 2005; Heath,
2016). The relational connection between a firm and a candidate can help minimize agency costs
by reducing informational asymmetries between candidates and firms and providing additional
motivation to workers that can improve performance (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, & GomezMejia, 2012). Thus referrals are an attractive recruitment method for all types of firms regardless
of size, governance structure, or goals (Pieper, 2015).
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Information asymmetries affect both candidates and firms in the hiring process (Akerlof,
1970). Formal recruitment processes are limited in their ability to both attain information about a
candidate and to provide candidates with complete information about working conditions in a
firm (Breaugh, 2008; Williamson, 1979). If these information asymmetries cannot be properly
mitigated, the likelihood of a contract agreement between candidates and firms is less likely
(Chrisman et al., 2014; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). However, referral utilization can help
mitigate information asymmetries, increasing both candidate and firm willingness to enter into a
contract. Because a referring owner is risking both their reputation and financial well-being by
recommending a candidate, they are expected to more fully vet these individuals before
recommending them to a firm (Pieper, 2015). Thus referrals are likely to occur only after trust
has been established after multiple encounters, resolving some of the information asymmetry
problems afflicting firms in the hiring process (Akerlof, 1970; Klotz et al., 2013). These
relationships may thus provide firms with tacit knowledge related to work ethic, trustworthiness,
etc. that may be hard to discern via formalized methods.
Information asymmetries are likely to impact candidates in the recruitment process as
well. Specifically, some higher quality candidates are likely to self-select out of the firm’s labor
pool because of the risks due to uncertainties caused by information asymmetries (Chrisman et
al., 2014; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). While these information asymmetries do not remove all
high-quality candidates from their labor pool, they do remove some (Akerlof, 1970). Thus the
probability of a firm selecting a low-quality candidate increases. However, owner referrals help
resolve some of the information asymmetries candidates may encounter as well (Akerlof, 1970).
Owner referred individuals are likely to experience greater discernment of their ability to survive
and thrive within a firm due to the additional information provided by the referring owner,
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lessening the ambiguity related to joining an organization (Van Den Bulte & Wuyts, 2007). Thus
referred candidates will be less likely to self-select out of the labor pool as the risks of joining a
firm that they are unsuited for is lowered (Chrisman et al., 2014; Yakubovich & Lup, 2006). This
increases the likelihood of these firms successfully selecting a high-quality candidate since more
of these individuals are expected to remain in the labor pool. This thus reduces the probability of
adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970).
Agency issues are likely to manifest after individuals join an organization as well. For
example, reduced nonfamily compensation and training are purported to create agency issues in
these firms that negatively influence their performance (Chrisman et al., 2014; Chrisman et al.,
2017; Neckebrouck et al., 2017). However, owner referrals may help address the agency issues
likely to afflict firms after individuals join an organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Individuals working alongside referring acquaintances experience greater job satisfaction and
commitment (Fernandez et al., 2000). Individuals prefer working alongside those with whom
they have a personal connection (Castilla, 2005). Likewise, research indicates referred members
experience lower productivity after the referring member leaves the firm (Fernandez et al.,
2000). This suggests that referring owners may be especially effective as monitors of the
referred employee, discouraging opportunistic behaviors as the referred member applies greater
effort so as to maintain a positive relationship with the owner for both personal and professional
reasons (Heath, 2016). In summary, utilizing owner referrals in selection may help reduce
agency costs in firms by lowering information asymmetries in hiring and enhancing motivation
during employment. This is expected to lead to improved firm performance. Thus, my next
hypothesis is:

37

Hypothesis 3: Owner referral utilization will be positively associated with firm
performance.

Referral Utilization and Family Firm Performance
As outlined in the assertions for hypothesis 1, high family essence firms are expected to
experience improved firm performance. This may occur because of the utilization of owner
referrals by family firms when hiring nonfamily employees. Although family firms may be
susceptible to hiring low effort and/or ability nonfamily employees, owner referral utilization in
hiring these members may help mitigate this possibility (Akerlof, 1970; Chrisman et al., 2014).
High family essence firms are likely to make greater utilization of referrals due to the increased
likelihood of employee fit. These firms are likewise expected to experience performance benefits
when utilizing these employees since referred employees are likely to have greater productivity
and longer tenures than other types of candidates (Brown et al., 2012).
In addition to the performance benefits associated with referral utilization, family firms
may face distinct challenges due to their unique structures and behaviors that can be alleviated
by the utilization of referrals. In particular, the relational connection, shared values, improved
communication and the implicit costs that may result from opportunistic behaviors underpin the
importance of owner referral utilization for high family essence firms (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).
Accordingly, owner referred nonfamily members may more readily accept the family’s
continued or increased involvement in the firm because they have a greater appreciation for the
shared values and social bond they experience with business family members (Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2005). When a strong, positive relationship is established, nonfamily employees
are thus more likely to grant greater latitude and assistance to business families in pursuing their
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goals. This suggests that referral utilization may increase the likelihood of nonfamily goal
alignment. This will allow firms marked by high family essence to maintain their competitive
advantage derived from long-term family control and more robust, family-like cultures through
greater organizational fit among their nonfamily members. Put simply, high family essence firms
are expected to have better performance in part because they make greater utilization of referrals
in hiring nonfamily employees which results in a better fitting, higher quality workforce.
Thus, based on the model’s predictions, I anticipate that owner referral utilization is key
to creating competitive advantage through family essence, by creating superior human capital.
Family essence encourages these firms to utilize referrals in hiring nonfamily. Because of both
the benefits of owner referral utilization and the unique qualities of these firms that necessitate
owner referral utilization, owner referrals will provide performance outcomes for these firms. I
therefore hypothesize that referral utilization will intervene in the relationship between family
essence and firm performance. Consequently, my next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4: Owner referral utilization will mediate the relationship between family
essence and firm performance.
In summary, this study proposes that owner referral utilization in hiring nonfamily
members helps explain family firm financial performance. The list of the respective hypotheses
are provided in Table 3.
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Hypothesized Relationships
Hypotheses

Relationship

1

Family essence will be positively associated with firm
performance.

Positive

2

Family essence will be positively associated with member
referral utilization in selection.

Positive

3

Referral utilization will be positively associated with firm
performance.

Positive

4

Referral utilization will mediate the relationship between
family essence and firm performance.

Mediation
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II
METHODOLOGY
In order to address the objectives of this dissertation, a quantitative study was employed
to test the proposed model and hypotheses. In this chapter, a description is provided of the data
collection procedures, survey and testing methods that were utilized to evaluate if the hypotheses
are empirically supported.
Overview
In conjunction with the data collection company Qualtrics and the Center of Family
Enterprise Research hosted at Mississippi State University, I utilized a survey method to collect
data for this study. Participants were attained via Qualtrics. The individuals utilized by Qualtrics
are adults who earn stipends for agreeing to complete online surveys. Only leaders or owners of
family firms with less than 250 employees who respond to attention filter items (e.g. “please
select the number 4”) were included in this sample. In total, I collected 200 firm leader/manager
surveys. This sample size allowed me to achieve a sufficient power of greater than 0.8
(McQuitty, 2004; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Responses from only family firm leaders were
included. For the purposes of this study, family firm leaders are defined as those whose family
has at least 50% ownership in a firm and with at least one biological relative (e.g. parent, son,
daughter, spouse, brother, sister, etc.) working in the firm or having previously worked in the
firm. Majority ownership in a firm was deemed necessary to ensure that owners had control and
influence over their firm (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Demsetz, 1983). Because of the nature of the
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study and the hypotheses outlined, a survey-based design is most suitable for the investigation
(Daspit, 2012). The target firms were small to medium-sized enterprises since their lack of
resources makes the successful inclusion of outside personnel more challenging (Greer et al.,
2016). Consistent with Tzabbar et al. (2017), I define small to medium-sized enterprises as those
with less than 250 employees.
Measures
Unless otherwise indicated, respondents evaluated the extent of their agreement with each
item on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Each of these scales
was identified after an extensive review of the extant literature and should be suitable for testing
the hypotheses. Table 4 provides a summary of the variables and measures that were used. Table
5 provides a list of the survey items for each variable.
Variables and measures summary
Variable

Measure

Dependent Variable
Firm Performance

8-item measure (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007)

Independent Variable

3-item measure (Debicki et al., 2016)

Family Essence
Mediator
Owner Referrals

Objective measure of recruitment method

Controls
Firm-level

Firm size (number of employees)
Firm age (number of years of operation)
CEO educational level
CEO Ownership percentage
CEO Tenure (number of years as CEO)
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Independent Variable
Family Essence. While family involvement is necessary to be a family firm, it cannot predict
that a firm will have differential behaviors from nonfamily firms (Chrisman et al., 2012). Instead,
‘family essence’ may help predict whether or not a firm will exert influence over the firm by
emphasizing the importance of transgenerational succession intentions and the family’s longterm commitment to the firm (Chrisman et al., 2012). Family essence was measured with the
family continuity subscale developed by Debicki et al. (2016). This subscale was chosen since it
well captures the commitment to the long-term family control of the firm. This subscale has
attained an appropriate reliability in other studies (i.e.

= 0.86 in Debicki et al., 2016). Business

leaders were asked the following: (1) How important is it that the business gives the members of
our family an opportunity to work as a unit, make decisions together and work toward
agreement? (2) If it is important that the firm remains in the hands of the family, the business
decisions will be directed at developing and motivating future generations toward taking over the
control of the firm. (3) How important is it that the company serves as a vessel through which
our family values are maintained and promoted to younger generations of family members?
Mediating Variable
Owner Referrals. Respondents were first informed that referrals refer to the practice of using
one’s social network and relationships to identify prospective job candidates. Respondents were
then asked “What percentage of nonfamily employees at your firm were recommended or
identified by you (the owner)?”
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Dependent Variable
Firm Performance. In the management literature, firm performance is one of the primary
dependent variables researchers test, trying to explain as much of what causes its variability as
possible (Madison, 2014; Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). However, since privately
held firms are often unwilling to provide financial information and forward-looking stock prices
are unavailable, self-reported measures of financial performance are necessary (Boehm, Kunze,
& Bruch, 2014; Madison, Kellermanns, & Munyon, 2017; Messersmith & Wales, 2011). Selfreported measures and objective performance measures have been found to be strongly
correlated indicating this offers a reliable measure (Wall et al., 2004). Therefore, I utilized an
overall measure of performance developed by Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) that usefully
includes assessments of both profitability and firm growth. This scale has produced adequate
reliability in previous research (e.g. = 0.88 in Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Family firm
leader/owners were asked to compare if their financial growth is/was much worse, about the
same, or better than their competitors, both currently and over the past three years, on a 7-point
scale, assessing their (1) Growth in sales (2) Growth in market share (3) Growth in number of
employees (4) Growth in profitability (5) Return on equity (6) Return on total assets (7) Profit
margin on sales (8) Ability to fund growth from profits. These individual scores were averaged
together to generate an overall performance score with higher values denoting better
performance (Dess & Robinson, 1984; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).
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Measurement Items
Variable
Family Essence

Items
(1) How important is it that the business gives the members of our family an
opportunity to work as a unit, make decisions together and work toward agreement?
(2) If it is important that the firm remains in the hands of the family, the business
decisions will be directed at developing and motivating future generations toward
taking over the control of the firm.
(3) How important is it that the company serves as a vessel through which our
family values are maintained and promoted to younger generations of family
members?

Referral
Utilization

(1) What percentage of nonfamily employees at your firm were recommended or
identified by you (the owner)?

Performance

(1) Growth in sales
(2) Growth in market share
(3) Growth in number of employees
(4) Growth in profitability
(5) Return on equity
(6) Return on total assets
(7) Profit margin on sales
(8) Ability to fund growth from profits.

Control Variables
To prevent unwelcome influence from an outside source, multiple control variables were
included in the analysis. To choose these variables, I considered both theory and empirical
findings. First, I controlled for firm age and firm size (i.e. the total number of employees at the
firm). These variables have all been shown to influence family firm behaviors and thus have
been used in prior family business studies as controls (Chang, Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns,
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2008; Fang et al., 2015; Frank, Kessler, Rusch, Suess-Reyes, & Weismeier-Sammer, 2016). Firm
age influences performance because it indicates a greater knowledge-base, market experience
and reputation that could affect recruitment (Foss & Pedersen, 2002; Turban & Cable, 2003).
Firm age was controlled by measuring the number of years since the firm was established (Davis
& Harveston, 2000; Memili, 2011). Firm size has been shown to influence family firm hiring
practices since, as size increases, the benefits of hiring nonfamily employees rises (Fang et al.,
2015). Firm size was measured by classifying firms into different sizes (1) 1-4 employees (2) 5-9
employees (3) 10-19 employees (4) 20-49 employees (5) 50-99 employees (6) 100-249
employees.
Additionally, I controlled for CEO tenure, CEO ownership percentage and CEO
educational level (Miller, Le-Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013; Miller & Le-Breton-Miller, 2006).
A control for CEO tenure is necessary as this has been shown to influence firm strategy and
performance. CEO ownership percentage may reflect other factors such as industry
characteristics, financing availability, performance outlook, etc. so controlling for it is
appropriate (Demsetz & Lehn, 2005). Educational level of the owner was controlled because
this may impact the quality of the social network available to owners in hiring (Covin, 1994).
Analysis & Results
To examine the validity and reliability of the constructs, a confirmatory factor analysis
was conducted using AMOS 26 (see below) (Garver & Mentzer, 1999). As part of this analysis,
a correlation matrix was composed. I likewise assessed for convergent validity by examining
average variance extracted (AVE) to ensure that scores are above 0.5. (Garver & Mentzer, 1999).
Composite reliability and Cronbach’s alpha were likewise reported with results above 0.7
indicating reliability (Nunnally, 1978). The Fornell and Larker (1981) method was utilized to
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evaluate discriminant validity. How well the measurement model fits the sample data was also
assessed by examining, among others, the comparative fit index (CFI) (0.95 or higher), the
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) (0.90 or higher) and, finally, the root mean square approximation
(RMSEA) (0.08 or lower).
To evaluate my hypotheses, I employed the PROCESS macro for SPSS and used biascorrected bootstrapping to test the hypotheses regarding direct and indirect effects (for example,
see Vardaman et al., 2018). My hypothesized model is similar to model 4 as described by Hayes
(2013) thus the PROCESS macro is suitable for evaluating my hypotheses. The bias-corrected
bootstrapping procedure to estimate indirect and direct effects deals with the problems associated
with the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach (Montani, Courcy, & Vandenberghe, 2017).
Bootstrapping involves resampling the data numerous times and then computing a 95%
confidence interval for the effects (Montani et al., 2017). Following the recommendation of
Hayes (2013), I used 2,000 bootstrapped samples to compute these confidence intervals.
Finally, the individual hypothesis tests are evaluated in chapter IV (see below). To
evaluate hypothesis 1, I tested the direct effect of family essence on financial performance. For
hypothesis 2, I similarly tested the direct effect of family essence on owner referral utilization in
recruitment. For hypothesis 3, I again tested for direct effects as it predicts owner referral
utilization will be positively related to firm performance. Hypothesis 4 predicts the intervening
effects of owner referral utilization implicit in hypothesis 1-3. I thus used a bootstrapping
technique to test for indirect effects.
The results of these analyses are presented in a separate table (see below). I then
examined each individual hypothesis, reporting coefficients and p-values to decipher whether or
not each individual hypothesis is supported. This information is likewise consolidated into a
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single table. Finally, I then created another table that reports means, standard deviations and
correlations of the respective variables (see chapter IV).
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter will examine the empirical results for the respective hypotheses. First, the
data will be described. Second, this will be followed by a discussion of reliability and validity for
the measurement items. Finally, hypotheses testing results will be presented.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
While data was collected from 200 family business owners and/or leaders, six of these
surveys were removed from the sample due to poor responses (i.e. missing key information,
straight-lining, etc.). Thus, the final sample size for this study was 194. This data was collected
via the data collection company Qualtrics who solicited and culled responses from their managed
panel of survey respondents who participated in exchange for incentive compensation. Invited
participants were further screened out according to their answers to a set of pre-selected
questions. To qualify, respondents had to indicate that they had at least 50% ownership in an
independent (non-franchise) small-to-medium sized business with at least four employees but
less than 250. In addition, respondents were required to indicate that, other than themselves, at
least one other family member was currently employed in the business. Finally, consent to a data
quality agreement promising to provide quality answers to each survey question was required.
The respondent population was 78% Caucasian and averaged approximately 44.8 years
old. Respondents averaged about 92.7% ownership with an average of 12.7 years in a leadership
position in their respective firm. These owners reported having an average of 3.25 family
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members working with their firm. As noted, in order to qualify for the survey, at least one family
member of the owner had to be employed with the business. 91.4% of these firm owners
indicated they consider their business to be a family firm (as opposed to a non-family firm).
Descriptive statistics for the sample and study variables are presented in Table 6 and 7 (Rogers,
2017).

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variable

M

SD

1.

Age

44.84

11.58

-

2.

Ownership

92.7

13.4

-0.21**

3.

3.25

1.42

0.18*

-0.20**

-

0.91

0.28

0.13

-0.23**

0.20**

5.

Employees
Family Business
Identity
Owner Referral
Hiring

39.68

29.57

-0.09

-0.17**

0.05

6.

SEW Continuity

3.99

1.13

-0.11

0.12

0.02

-.18*

0.11 1 0.79

7.

Succession

0.87

0.33

-0.08

-0.05

-0.13

.26**

-0.09 9 -.22**

-

8

Performance

4.27

1.08

0.25**

-0.11

0.14

-.05

0.22***0.27**

-0.29

4.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

-

N = 194
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level
* Coefficient is significant at the .01 level
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0.0 4-

0.93

Descriptive Statistics
Variable
1. Leader Age
2. Firm Age
3. Succession
4. SEW Continuity (1)
5. SEW Continuity (2)
6. SEW Continuity (3)
7. Referrals
8. Performance (1)
9. Performance (2)
10. Performance (3)
11. Performance (4)
12. Performance (5)
13. Performance (6)
14. Performance (7)
15. Performance (8)

Min

Max

Mean

SD

20
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

71
61
1
5
5
5
100
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

44.84
19.66
1.12
4.02
3.95
4.00
46.95
4.55
4.19
3.89
4.44
4.23
4.21
4.29
4.34

11.58
13.65
0.33
1.11
1.22
1.12
29.05
1.1
1.14
1.17
1.07
1.23
1.21
1.15
1.16

Reliability Analysis
Using SPSS version 26, measurement scales were evaluated for reliability. This involved
assessing that the Cronbach’s alpha was greater than 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978), item-to-total
correlations were above 0.5 and inter-item correlations were greater than 0.3. Table 4.1 indicates
scale reliability as each Cronbach’s alpha exceeds 0.7. Likewise, item-to-total correlations were
in excess of the 0.5 threshold. Finally, inter-item correlations were all above 0.3. Therefore,
suitable reliability results for these scales was attained. Reliability analysis results are presented
in Table 8 and 9.
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Reliability Analysis - SEW

Scale Item
1. SEW Continuity (1)
2. SEW Continuity (2)
3. SEW Continuity (3)

M
4.02
3.95
4.00

SD
1.11
1.22
1.12

Item-total
correlations
0.66
0.73
0.76

Inter-item Correlations
1
2
3
0.60
0.63

0.71

Reliability Analysis – Firm Performance
Item-total
Scale Item

Inter-item Correlations

M

SD

correlations

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Performance (1)

4.55

1.1

0.76

2. Performance (2)

4.19

1.14

0.74

0.80

3. Performance (3)

3.89

1.17

0.58

0.47

0.54

4. Performance (4)

4.44

1.07

0.82

0.67

0.60

0.53

5. Performance (5)

4.23

1.23

0.80

0.65

0.59

0.47

0.74

6. Performance (6)

4.21

1.21

0.80

0.61

0.60

0.45

0.70

0.79

7. Performance (7)

4.29

1.15

0.75

0.56

0.56

0.42

0.69

0.66

0.72

8. Performance (8)

4.34

1.16

0.82

0.62

0.61

0.53

0.76

0.69

0.73

7

0.74

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
SPSS was used to perform a confirmatory factor analysis. A confirmatory factor analysis
is necessary to test whether measures accurately measure their respective latent variables
(Rogers, 2017). Table 10 indicates that the items each loaded on their appropriate construct.
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Standardized Regression Weights

Scale Item
SEW-C (1)
SEW-C (2)
SEW-C (3)
PERF (1)
PERF (2)
PERF (3)
PERF (4)
PERF (5)
PERF (6)
PERF (7)
PERF (8)
Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)

Constructs
SEW - C
0.728
0.799
0.866

PERF

0.777
0.771
0.618
0.839
0.813
0.820
0.780
0.847
0.639

0.618

The confirmatory analysis was also used to test for convergent and discriminant validity.
Convergent validity refers to the extent to which measures that should be related to each other
are actually related to each other (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Convergent validity is evaluated by
considering the average variance extracted (AVE). Average variance extracted measures the
amount of variance attained by a construct in relation to the variance attributable to error (Fornell
& Larker, 1981). Average variance extracted should be in excess of 0.50 for each measure. As
shown in Table 4.5, the AVE for both constructs was above the 0.50 threshold, indicating
evidence of convergent validity.
Discriminant validity examines whether measures that are not supposed to be related to
each other are, in fact, unrelated to each other (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). To determine
discriminant validity, the average variance extracted was compared with the squared correlation
between the respective constructs (Fornell & Larker, 1981). As shown in Table 11, the squared
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correlation is lower than either construct’s average variance extracted, thus offering support for
discriminant validity.

Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Squared Correlations
Measurement Scale

1

1. SEW - Family Continuity

0.639

2. Firm Performance

0.072

2

0.618

Average Variance Extracted (AVE) included on the diagonal.

Next, common method bias was tested using a latent common method factor (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). This test revealed that the inclusion of the latent common
method factor did not significantly affect model fit (c2/df = 3.80/1 df). Thus common method
bias does not seem to be a foremost issue.
The CFA was also utilized to evaluate model fit by examining different goodness-of-fit
statistics. As shown in Table 12, The hypothesized model provided suitable overall fit (IFI =
0.985; CFI = 0.985; TLI = 0.976; RMR = 0.040; RMSEA = 0.057). Although some fit statistics
did not meet their recommended threshold, some research has contended that these indices
cutoffs should be treated as guidelines and not exact rules (Iacobucci, 2010).
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Model Fit
Model

Chi-sq/df

Model

1.620

Preferred Criteria

p

IFI

CFI

TLI

RMR

RMSEA

0.02

0.985

0.985

0.976

0.040

0.057

.05<

.95<

.95<

.95<

<.05

<.05

Results of Hypotheses Testing
This dissertation hypothesized that owner referral utilization would help explain the
relationship between family firms and their overall financial performance. The hypotheses
proposed that family essence would directly influence both firm performance and owner referral
utilization (Hypotheses 1-2). It was also proposed that owner referral utilization would directly
influence firm performance (Hypothesis 3). Finally, owner referral utilization was hypothesized
to mediate the positive relationship between family essence and firm performance (Hypothesis
4).
Hypothesis 1 stated that family essence would have a positive effect on financial
performance. Family essence was measured with the SEWi – Continuity subscale (Debicki et al,
2016). Family essence was found to be positively related to firm performance (ß = 0.230, SE =
0.064, t = 3.605, p < 0.05). Thus hypothesis 1 is supported. Likewise, family essence was found
to be positively related to utilization of owner referrals (ß = 4.312, SE = 1.999, t = 2.156, p <
0.05). Thus hypothesis 2 is supported. Next, owner referral utilization was found to be positively
related to firm performance (ß = 0.005, SE = 0.002, t = 2.176, p < 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis 3
is supported. Finally, hypothesis 4 contended that owner referral utilization mediates the
relationship between family essence and firm performance. This hypothesis is likewise supported
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(g = 0.022, CI = 0.0001 to 0.0573).1,2 Taken together, these results support both the model and
hypotheses. A summary of the test results for these revised hypotheses is included in table 13.

List of Revised Hypotheses Test Results
Hypotheses

Expected
Relationship
Positive

Test
Result
Support

1

Family essence will be positively associated with firm
performance.

2

Family essence will be positively associated with
owner referral utilization in selection.

Positive

Support

3

Owner referral utilization will be positively associated
with firm performance.

Positive

Support

4

Owner referral utilization will mediate the relationship
between family essence and firm performance.

Mediation

Support

1

Alternatively, the family firm variable could also be measured by the number of family members involved in firm
leadership/management (Chrisman et al., 2012). A robustness check was conducted with the number of family
members involved in management as the independent variable and found hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 all with similar
significant results while hypothesis 1 was marginally significant.
2
Another robustness check was performed with industry (manufacturing, service, retail, other) as a control variable.
Firm industry can affect performance due to differing business conditions between industries (Tsai, 2001). However,
to maintain adequate statistical power, the control variable for firm size was excluded. The results were essentially
the same as those reported here with all hypotheses found to be significant.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This study was designed as an examination of how the source of nonfamily employees
impacts the performance of family firms. I utilized agency theory to hypothesize that selecting
nonfamily employees from an owner’s social network would reduce information asymmetries in
the hiring process and thus improve the quality and fit of the nonfamily employees selected by
firms. Thus referral utilization would indirectly influence the relationship between family
essence and firm performance. In doing so, I sought to answer three research questions: (1) Are
firms with greater family essence more likely to utilize owner referrals in selection? (2) Does the
utilization of owner referrals lead to higher firm performance? (3) Does owner referral utilization
mediate the relationship between family essence and firm performance?
All three of these questions were confirmed with significant results being found for all
hypotheses. This study demonstrates that preexisting social ties with an owner are likely to be
especially advantageous in identifying quality nonfamily candidates who have heightened fit to
the organization’s needs and culture since owners are expected to possess greater insight into the
needs of the firm than others. Firm owners are expected to have greater knowledge about who
will succeed in these firms and fit their unique needs. With family firms often marked my
distinct idiosyncrasies, this knowledge may be especially advantageous for these firms when
selecting personnel (Lee et al., 2003). For instance, these owners may have vital information
related to a prospective candidate’s work ethic, cultural fit and honesty that cannot be readily
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attained through resumes or structured interviews. Such qualities may be especially important in
the more informal environments characteristic of many family firms due to their lessened use of
monitoring devices and evaluative practices (Mitchell et al., 2003). Put simply, recommending
owners will be more privy to the unique needs and expectations of the firm, mitigating some of
the asymmetric information problems associated with family firm recruitment (Chrisman et al.,
2014; Pieper, 2015).
Likewise, these connections are perhaps more likely to elicit cooperation and norms of
reciprocity between the owner and the employees (Luo & Chung, 2005). With a strong
connection to the owner, these nonfamily employees may sense a greater obligation to assist the
owner in goal achievement since these individuals were given the opportunity by the owner
themselves. Further, a heightened quality of relationship is likely to exist among owner-referred
nonfamily employees, consequently fostering greater trust, cohesiveness and firm spirit (Uhlaner
et al., 2015). Consequently, these employees are less likely to turnover (Allen et al., 2010;
Vardaman et al., 2015). Thus, for these nonfamily employees, their effort may reflect more than
simply the financial incentives offered by the business.
In addition to contributions related to nonfamily employee utilization, this study
contributes further evidence to the literature that prioritizing socioemotional wealth goals may be
correlated with increased financial returns as well. For instance, Debicki et al. (2017) found that
many socioemotional wealth priorities were in fact associated with increased economic returns.
Researchers have noted that socioemotional wealth goals such as a positive reputation or
transgenerational succession intentions can lead to economic benefits encouraging stronger ties
in the community and extending goal horizons so as to better ensure long-term profitability
(Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Likewise, socioemotional
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wealth priorities encourage the involvement of the family in the firm, fostering a long-term
commitment and steward-like behaviors among these firm members (Davis, Allen, & Hayes,
2010; Madison et al., 2015). For these reasons, research has generally found that socioemotional
wealth goals can improve firm performance. This present research helps provide further
empirical evidence that certain family-centered goals, such as transgenerational succession
intentions, are not necessarily in conflict with financial goals.
Practical Implications
This study may offer important insights for family business owner-managers as they hire
nonfamily employees. The results indicate that utilizing the owner’s social network as a means
for hiring nonfamily employees may be a useful strategy for improving the human capital of
family businesses committed to the controlling family unit. Nonfamily employees are considered
one of the most difficult challenges of family firms (Tabor et al., 2018). One of the primary
challenges relates to the family-centric nature of these firms. Conceptual, quantitative and
qualitative efforts in family business research have emphasized how the pursuit of familycentered benefits can alter the goals and strategies of family firms that can strain the relationship
between family owners-managers and nonfamily members (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003;
Gómez-Mejía, Larraza-kintana, & Makri, 2003; Karra et al., 2006). These researchers have
emphasized the negative effect of lessened pecuniary and advancement incentives available to
nonfamily and, also, the impact that short shrift differential treatment would engender among
these employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). In a seminal article on nonfamily employees in
family firms, Chrisman and colleagues (2014) systematically argued that the human resource
proclivities among family firms is expected to produce an ineffective, unmotivated workforce
that often makes the hiring of nonfamily unwarranted and counterproductive.
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However, our results show that this may not necessarily be the case. Although familycentric goals may impair the recruitment of some nonfamily members, these same goals may
help create positive work environments that could attract certain nonfamily members (Tabor et
al., 2018). Due to lower information asymmetries, nonfamily members with a relational
connection to the owner may be best positioned to recognize how the family’s contribution to the
firm positively benefit the firm’s culture. Thus, nonfamily members in an owner’s social
network may be more attracted to these firms. Further, these owners may more readily recognize
individuals who fit their firm’s culture. Therefore, by hiring such individuals, firm owners may
be better able to achieve both their financial and nonfinancial goals.
Limitations & Future Research
As with all studies, this study is not without its limitations. First, while a test was
performed showing common method bias did not significantly affect the model, the singlesource methodology may still have biased the results by creating artificial intercorrelations as
respondents may employ a partiality toward either a positive or negative response (Aronson,
Reilly & Lynn, 2008; Aviolo, Yammarino & Bass, 1991). While not trying to minimize this
limitation, some research, citing the lack of empirical evidence, has cast doubts on the assumed
magnitude of bias in single-source studies (Spector, 2006). However, future research could
collect responses from different respondents to help handle this limitation.
Moreover, some control variables may not have been accounted for. However, research
recommends that control variables be used prudently to prevent adverse effects such as reduced
statistical power (Podsakoff, Mackenzie & Podsakoff, 2012). Thus the addition of other
theoretically-justifiable control variables could have adversely influenced the results. However,
doing so would likely help bolster the causal inference contended by the model that may be
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wanting due to the cross-sectional design of the study (York, 2017). To accommodate additional
control variables, future research could utilize larger sample sizes to help mitigate any reductions
in statistical power caused by such additional control variables. Likewise, a longitudinal study
design with data collected from multiple respondents at varying time intervals would mark an
improvement on the present study’s design. Further, future studies would benefit from
demonstrating greater robustness in the findings. Studies that found similar results with various
parameters, conditions and measures of the variables would improve the confidence in the
correctness of the conclusions of this study. The problem of endogeneity may also be a concern
in this study since it is possible the dependent variable is influencing the independent variable
instead and not just vice versa as proposed in the model. In particular, family essence may be
influenced by the performance of the firm as family firm leaders may be more desirous of
preserving the family’s continuity with the firm as performance increases due to other factors
such as the enhanced reputation, improved career opportunities for future generations, etc. that
may result from improved performance.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
By using the family firm context to inform human resource research, this research
extends knowledge on how firms with strong commitments to the controlling family unit can
attain quality human capital that assist them in achieving their performance goals. While family
business research has generally been doubtful of the ability of family firms to successfully attain
quality nonfamily employees (Chrisman et al., 2014; Chrisman et al., 2017), this research
provides a more nuanced view by considering how certain types of nonfamily employees may be
better suited to help these firms attain their financial goals. This research revealed the utilization
of nonfamily employees recommended by owners helps explain firm performance. Because
candidates with a relational connection to the owner are expected to have deeper knowledge
about a firm or job opening, they are better positioned to make a more informed decision as to
whether they should join the firm. Likewise, owners are expected to have useful information
about known candidates that may be difficult to attain via formal methods (Pieper, 2015). This
will better ensure that nonfamily fitting the needs of the firm will be more readily attained.
Building on this, this study demonstrated that socioemotional wealth goals emphasizing
family continuity leads to greater utilization of owner referrals. The family business literature
suggests that although family involvement is necessary to be a family firm, it may not predict
differential behaviors between family firms and nonfamily firms (Chrisman et al., 2012). Instead,
‘family essence,’ as represented by the family’s long-term commitment to the firm, may better
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predict distinctive behaviors between family and nonfamily firms. This present study provides
further empirical evidence of these differential behaviors by showing that a commitment to the
family’s longevity and presence in the firm is associated with increased owner referral
utilization. My desire is that this research will lead to further research into how family firms are
able to successfully utilize nonfamily employees to achieve both their financial goals.
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